Ethical Leadership: An Ancient Solution to a Modern Challenge

1. The Modern Challenge of Ethical Leadership

In a complex system, the conspicuousness of the inputs does not determine the magnitude of the outputs. A tiny shift can lead to an avalanche. Modernity has supercharged the likelihood and severity of outsized effects like these through global interconnectedness and low friction communication. In an environment like this, where a single bad decision can change the world, leadership is a burden to be carried skillfully and seriously. 

There are many decision-making tools available to leaders. These include exhaustive information gathering, decision tree analyses, and red teaming. And, while any of these can improve the process informing a decision, none of them can guarantee the desirability of its consequences. There is no knowledge or technique potent enough to tame the fundamental unpredictability of the world—but it is clearly worth the effort to seek out and acquire those tools that offer marginal improvements. 

There is a second dimension to the decision making of leaders that is more difficult to account for and influence. Whether, in the end, a leader will get what they desire is something that can be estimated, albeit with difficulty and uncertainty. Whether what they desire is good is a trickier question. Intentions can often only be extrapolated from results. And even were they transparent, the criteria by which they can be judged remain in contention. Not knowing the motives of those in power, nor even how to evaluate those motives if they were known. is a serious problem.  Despite the inherent unpredictability of outcomes, it is self-evident that, regardless of how well-informed or finely-tuned their decision-making process may be, leaders who are out of ethical alignment cannot make good decisions regardless of the outcomes those decisions produce. Good intentions rarely pan out; bad intentions are always problematic. 

Much research has been done and many resources have been devoted to improving the reliability of decisions to produce their intended outcomes. Comparatively little has been done to improve the goodness of those decisions. It is with the second of these objectives—with the development of ethical leadership—that this essay is concerned. It will attempt to answer the dual questions of whether, in a world of exponential causality, the internally-focused, virtue ethic prescriptions of Stoicism are (1) necessary and (2) sufficient for guiding ethical leadership. It will first briefly define ‘leadership’ before exploring several theories of ethical leadership as comparisons for Stoicism.

1.1 Leadership Defined

Leadership has been defined in many ways by many people. For some, it is simply a way to describe any act that seeks to make a person or situation better (Stutman, n.d.). For others, it is the attracting and maintaining of followership (Hughes, 2017).  And for still others it is, “…a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal,” (Northouse, 2016, p. 6). But, as Stogdill (1974) acknowledges in a review of leadership research, the number of definitions is nearly equivalent to the number of people seeking to define it. Still, Northouse (2016) ventures a guess at the core components shared by most of these definitions: “(a) Leadership is a process, (b) leadership involves influence, (c) leadership occurs in groups, and (d) leadership involves common goals” (p. 6). 

But even these elements fail to encompass the well-established and widely researched field of self-leadership which Neck and Houghton (2006) describe as “…a process through which individuals control their own behavior, influencing and leading themselves through the use of specific sets of behavioral and cognitive strategies,” (p. 270). It may strike the reader how similar this sounds to an appreciable portion of Stoic practice. And, it is for precisely this reason that I will not be concerning myself with the question of Stoicism as ethical self-leadership. Rather, I will address a more interesting set of questions, among them how limiting the scope of ethical concern to one’s own sphere of control intersects with influencing others. So, for the purpose of focusing on leadership as it pertains to the leading of groups, the operant definition of leadership will be ‘an emergent dynamic characterized by the wielding of influence by a person or people in relation to others who believe they share a desired outcome’. 

Influence, whether it be leadership or otherwise, is a form of power. For this reason, the ethical implications of leadership demand investigation. Given this, and the extent to which leadership has drawn interest from so many sectors, the dearth of ethical leadership focused research and established theory is surprising and troublesome. Nevertheless, for the sake of evaluating the Stoic framework, the discussion will now turn to some noteworthy contributions to the field.

2. The Development of Morally Mature Leadership

First up are the Stages of Leadership Development model and Kohlberg’s Model of Moral Development. These will be treated as two branches of the same tree since, though the former does not directly address the question of ethics and the latter is not specifically about leadership, when taken together they provide a picture of how leaders develop their moral sophistication. I do not intend to conflate moral and ethical, but given the lack of theories in this space, this one is close enough to the search criteria to be serviceable.

2.1 How Morality Develops

Kohlberg’s (1984) model identifies six stages of moral development that a person can pass through. These can be described as follows.

What this model provides is not a justification for one particular set of ethical norms, nor for a set of principles intended to evaluate ethical norms (e.g. utilitarianism, deontology), but rather a description of how morality affects decision making through its various stages of development. It is, in many ways, echoed by the Stages of Leadership Development model and its component Action Logics.

2.2 Leadership and Action Logic

The Stages of Leadership Development model summarizes the course leaders take as they evolve their action logics—the schema according to which they understand, make judgments, and act (Torbert, 2004). The stages of this model can be represented in this way:

As previously stated, there are many similarities shared by these two models. They both see the individual going from a state of selfish, and self-protective, individualism to one of identification with orthodoxy to a rediscovery of individual self that is expressed by making a unique contribution to the system in which that self is embedded. A similar description is provided by Kegan’s Model of Adult Development (1982) and Beck’s Spiral Dynamics (1996). So, given the convergence of these theories on how morally mature leadership develops, the question now is whether the Stoic ethical framework guides its adherents along a comparable path and toward a similar destination.

2.3 A Comparison with Oikeiosis

The concept of oikeiosis will be of central importance here. Variously translated as ‘affinity’, ‘familiarization’, and ‘appropriation’ it is the process of ‘making something one’s own’ (Routledge, n.d.). Exactly in keeping with the models of development previously reviewed, its initial stage is characterized by the focus on self-preservation and selfish benefit found in all animals (Sellars, 2006). But, for human beings, this is merely the seed of the impulse rather than its full flowering. As it matures, the individual’s circle of concern grows wider, encompassing more. They come to see their family, friends, fellow citizens, and the entire human race as their own. Translations like ‘appropriation’ and phrasing such as ‘see the human race as your own’ may strike an odd note. 

But, what is meant is not ownership—it is identification with. Consider that, if a hand could speak, it would refer to ‘my body’ just as an individual uses the phrase ‘my family’ to denote something of which they are a part and with which they identify. The ultimate extension of oikeiosis is an individual’s identification with the cosmos—the adoption of a universal perspective. “Moral good—for the Stoics, the only kind of good there is—has a cosmic dimension: it is the harmonization of the reason within us with the reason which guides the cosmos…” (Hadot, 1995, p. 229).

As a consequence of this, the Stoic may find themselves called by a higher (or deeper) duty to act in ways that flout social conventions and existing laws. The Stoic recognizes that such precedents can guide them in ways that are in or out of alignment with virtue. They must, therefore, be cautious rather than obedient for, ultimately, virtue is only ever the individual’s responsibility. Such ethical sensibilities mirror those described in the sixth stage of the Kohlberg’s model and the preeminence of the question ‘What does the world need?’ for the most evolved action logic in Torbert’s model.

Clearly, the Stoic path parallels those described by Kohlberg and Torbert. The defining concerns of the beginning stages are the selfish pursuit of advantage and avoidance of pain or discomfort. This is followed by identification with a group or society—a seeing things from the perspective of the group that makes the upholding of rules and norms appear to be an ethical duty. This, in turn, gives way to a sense of individual autonomy characterized by the recognition that who we are is who we are dedicated to being. But, continued development further broadens the individual’s perspective, and with it comes the awareness that there are larger and deeper concerns that take the form of universal principles. The individual, in their moral/ethical/leaderly sensibilities, goes from selfish to systemic. “Greatness of soul is the fruit of the universality of thought… the whole of the philosopher’s speculative and contemplative effort becomes a spiritual exercise, insofar as he raises his thought up to the perspective of the whole, and liberates it from the illusions of individuality,” (Hadot, 1995, p. 97).

Given the similarities between the ethical path of Stoicism and the development of moral leadership as it is outlined by these converging theories, it seems justified to claim that something akin to Stoic ethics—particularly the concept of oikeiosis—is a necessary element of ethical leadership. If a leader’s circle of concern never extends beyond themselves or those closest to them, the result is narcissistic particularism. If that leader’s ethical sensibilities never deepen past what their society has established, they can only ever perpetuate the status quo which, on a long enough timeline, is indistinguishable from tyranny.  

3. Virtue and Value

While the discussion has thus far provided reason to believe that Stoicism values, for the individual leader, developmental outcomes that are in keeping with some of the most well-regarded theories, we do not yet know whether it provides sufficient direction regarding outward facing actions. One of the definitional characteristics of leaders, after all, is the greater than normal power their influence allows them to wield. If something like the Stoic ethical framework is to prove sufficient for ethical leadership, the guidance it provides on how to employ this power is of central importance. 

3.1 Utilitarian Leadership

“Leaders can do far more than just make their own behavior more ethical. Because they are responsible for the decisions of others as well as their own, they can dramatically multiply the amount of good they do by encouraging others to be better” (Bazerman, 2020, para.14). This author goes on to propose, as the guiding metric of ethical leadership, what he calls maximum sustainable goodness. This, he defines as “…the level of value creation that we can realistically achieve” (Bazerman, 2020, para. 6). Despite the coining of this phrase and the title of the essay—A New Model for Ethical Leadership—what he is proposing is essentially utilitarianism. While the words ‘value’ and ‘goodness’ are substituted for ‘utility’, the word ‘maximum’ adds nothing to the original philosophy. 

The same might be said for ‘sustainable’ and ‘realistic’ which are not synonyms, but which were both already covered by an expansive understanding of utilitarianism. To say this is neither an attack on the author’s position, nor upon the honesty with which he represents that position since he spends several paragraphs acknowledging that he aligns himself with Bentham and the utilitarian approach. In fact, his arguments provide a valuable opportunity to test Stoicism against one of ethical philosophy’s perennial heavyweights.

3.2 Points of Divergence

The central point of disagreement between the two approaches is made apparent by the author’s implication that, since a leader making their own behavior more ethical is relatively easy and, therefore, insufficient, ethical concern should extend beyond what is in the leader’s control. This position is followed by the claim that leaders bear responsibility for the decisions of others which, in combination with establishing maximum sustainable goodness as the orienting goal, posits a dynamic which, for the Stoic, should inspire wariness. 

Locating goodness out in the world creates the problem of weighing the potential good against the reliable good. People are generally able to predict the internal ethical consequences of their actions with respectable accuracy. The person concerned with their character often has a clear sense of which decision is virtuous and which is lacking in virtue (e.g. Lying about this will make me feel guilty). But, the same kinds of judgment become unreliable when made about potential external consequences (e.g. Lying about this might make things easier for people). The closest thing we have to a guarantee about external events is that they will not turn out as expected. In this sense, acting because you believe it will result in good according to utilitarian calculations is akin to flipping a coin because you expect it will turn up heads.

This position becomes even more troublesome when externals are placed on equal footing with what is internal. The individual may then find themselves weighing the degradation of their own character against the presumed benefit to others. When you believe the outcomes you are pursuing are good, it is easy to assume for yourself the mantle of goodness to conceal the truth to which your character attests. And there is no person more dangerous than one who is convinced enough of the virtue of their mission to disregard the condition of their character. Georges Friedmann offers an observation about how the desire to reform the world can be premature: “This work on yourself is necessary…. Lots of people let themselves be wholly absorbed by militant politics and the preparation for social revolution. Rare, much more rare, are they who, in order to prepare for the revolution, are willing to make themselves worthy of it” (Hadot qtd., 1995, p. 81). 

Organizational research has made clear that the example set by leaders drives the development of culture which, more than any strategy or vision, determines the nature of the endeavor (Schein, 2016). When you set out to change the world, what you accomplish will reflect your character rather than your ideals. And when the results are unsatisfactory, the tendency is to do more rather than to be more. The higher you aim, the greater the justifiable sacrifice. This is why, throughout history, the phrase most synonymous with persecution and slaughter has been ‘for the greater good’. One wonders how many of history’s most infamous leaders would have done so much damage if they had defaulted to asking, ‘What would a good leader do for their people’ rather than ‘What would a leader do for the good of their people’.

3.3 Points of Agreement

It is not my intention to suggest that Stoicism makes no space for utilitarian decision making. “Rather than claiming that all externals should be a matter of pure indifference, the Stoics… suggest that there is nothing wrong with preferring some indifferents over others. It is perfectly natural, they suggest, to prefer to be healthy rather than ill, or rich rather than poor” (Sellars, 2006, p. 111-112). The crucial distinction between utilitarian and Stoic ethics is not the kinds of calculations they make, but how they value the consequences of the resulting decisions. The utilitarian throws everything into a single pot, while the Stoic regards internal consequences as possessing a value incomparable to that of external ones. Where externals can be turned to undesirable ends, virtue is always good; where externals can be accumulated, virtue is either present or it is not; where externals alone can never be sufficient for a eudaemonic life, virtue alone is all such a life requires.

3.3.1 Enter the Trolley. Let us employ the Trolley problem to illustrate how this difference would look in application. The standard version of this problem involves a trolley headed for five people who are tied to the tracks. On a separate track is a single person. You and you alone have the time to pull a switching lever that will divert the trolley so that one person dies instead of five. Given what we know about each ethical system, one can imagine that the Stoic and the Utilitarian would make the same choice, but the Stoic would do so believing it the preferred course of action rather than the good one. For the reason previously articulated, this is a crucial distinction for leaders to make—it prevents the leader from having the option to offload their own individual ‘being good’ onto the outcomes produced by their ‘doing good’.

There is another possibility here that requires explanation. For most utilitarians, killing one to save five would be the right decision, but not one that they might call good. This suggests two possible sentiments. The first is that utilitarians are more virtue ethicists (or deontologists) than they might want to believe; the second, that they do not subscribe to a binary understanding of ethics, holding instead to a spectrum of better and worse as in ‘killing one to save five was good, but it would have been better to save six’. Again, there is some similarity to Stoicism here as a spectrum comprised of dispreferred to preferred to even more preferred is entirely coherent with the system. But the problem, once again, comes from a failure to distinguish between the things under and not under a person’s control. There is a qualitative difference between ‘I would prefer that outcome, but this one is only slightly less desirable’ and ‘This is the right behavior, but that one is only slightly less right’. 

Unlike the desirability of outcomes, the ethicality of decisions cannot be located on a spectrum. This is because, while a person is responsible for the outcomes they produce, they own the decisions they make. It is wise to make accommodations for the unexpected and uncontrollable; it is folly and cowardice to do the same for what is entirely one’s own because, while a poor outcome does not contribute to creating a poor character, a poor decision does. Willfully making a close-to-right decision is still choosing something other than what is right. And, not only is this discrete choice unethical, it creates the conditions for further trespasses. 

3.3.2 Ethical Frameworks and Systems Archetypes. As we have seen, an ethical framework that does not distinguish between what is under our control and what is not must, as a result, accept a spectrum of rightness. But, this concession has consequences. It establishes the conditions necessary for the Eroding Goals system archetype. This occurs when the acceptance of almost right behavior leads, over repeated iterations, to less and less desirable behaviors as it becomes increasingly difficult to enforce a standard that has already been compromised. When a leader allows desired but unreliable ends to justify less than virtuous means, they establish for themselves a new, lower standard for what is ethically permissible. And because it is impossible to ever do enough ‘good’ in the world, the ethical toll only ever rises. This is how, one tiny compromise at a time, would be leaders who plan to change the system from the inside find themselves, instead, being changed by it. 

The most effective countermeasure to this dynamic are strong standards below which it is not acceptable to fall (Senge, 2006). Stoicism provides this by making a hard demarcation between what is ethical and unethical, thereby eliminating the shades of gray that Utilitarianism must allow for, and by ensuring that these standards are behavioral rather than outcome-based such that they are defensible even in the most unpredictable circumstances.

4. The Dangers of Stoic Leadership

Nancy Sherman opens her book on Stoicism’s lessons for modern living with this quote from civil rights activist Angela Davis: “I am no longer accepting the things I cannot change. I am changing the things I cannot accept,” (2021). The quote is juxtaposed alongside Epictetus’s dictum that, while some things are up to us, others are not and must be accepted. The message is clear and reiterated throughout the work: Stoic ethics struggle when faced with social ills of a systemic nature. But leadership, as it has been used throughout this paper, involves action that transcends the self. To address whether Stoic ethics can be effective when faced with issues like systemic inequality, environmental degradation, and large-scale conflict, we must start with the three core disciplines of Stoicism which can be paraphrased in this way:

Desire- willing all that is and has been to be as they are
Action- behaving in accord with universal reason in service of the larger system
Judgment- seeing things as they are rather than merely assenting to initial impressions

The disciplines of both action and judgment would clearly be of great facility in tackling systemic problems as the former provides the impetus to action while the latter supplies guidance based on an objective understanding of the realities involved. It is, however, understandable that those who call for change might regard the discipline of desire as problematic to their undertaking. Epictetus’s formulation would do little to calm these concerns: “Don’t seek that all that comes about should come about as you wish, but wish that everything that comes about should come about as it does,” (2014, p. 289). But, understood in the context of the larger philosophical system, this admonishment is not so easily critiqued.

4.1 Effective Action Through Acceptance 

Stoicism is a present-focused philosophy, so willing things to be as they are is not equivalent to willing that things go on being as they are. Rather, the embrace of the present is an embrace of one’s own place in the unfolding of the world. The Stoic who lived in a racially segregated country and was called to fight for civil rights would accept the situation as it was and, wasting no time on resentment or regret, proceed to act. They would be neither perturbed nor put off by setbacks. Failing to achieve desired outcomes, which are ultimately out of their control, would not demotivate or derail them. Each moment of work devoted to creating positive change would be its own triumph of virtue. 

It is, conversely, the failure to accept what is, and the inner turmoil this failure produced, that would lead to frustration and paralysis. “After all, isn’t inner peace the surest guarantee of effective action?” (Hadot, 1998, p. 210). The discipline of desire, then, compels action rather than impeding it, forming one half of what Collins (2001) calls the Stockdale Paradox: having faith in the venture while accepting the challenges it faces. Only the highest-level leaders embody this paradox. One obvious example is Nelson Mandela who, though he never professed himself a Stoic, could hardly have been a better representative of its ethics. He did not refuse to accept his imprisonment. Rather, he refused to allow it to change him—to dampen his courage or warp his sense of justice. Had he found a way to burn down the prison that held him, it would have spared him discomfort at the price of his purpose.

4.2 Character Creates Change

There is a second concern raised about Stoicism and systemic change, which Sherman (2021) illustrates by highlighting the historical fact that, despite their claims about shared humanity and cosmic reason being common to all people, the ancient Stoics never took a stand against slavery. Instead, they made observations such as “…they are our fellow-slaves, if one reflects that Fortune has equal rights over slaves and free men alike” (Seneca, 1925, p. 104) while failing to acknowledge that an injustice was being imposed by one person on another. Sherman contends that, by limiting the ethical territory to what is internal, Stoicism establishes a system according to which the only rejoinder against slavery is that the enslaver is harming themselves by acting contrary to their own virtue. She recommends for Stoicism an injection of empathy and community-mindedness that would allow it to function as a force for good in a modern context.

Her argument is based on several faulty assumptions. First, with respect to any individual Stoic denouncing slavery, there has never been a person who was the perfect embodiment of Stoicism. It is therefore disingenuous to critique the philosophical system rather than the individuals who imperfectly followed it. It was Seneca, not Stoicism, who acknowledged the humanity of his slaves while failing to free them. And that raises a second faulty assumption: that our modern sensibilities can be foisted upon people from a different era. The ancient Stoics lived in a world in which every population that they would have been aware of practiced slavery, and one in which having your occupational role in society chosen for you was standard for people of every class. 

It is unreasonable to assume that their philosophy could have transcended their culture by thousands of years and prefigured the modern conception of universal human rights upon which many would now base their condemnations of slavery. Sherman acknowledges this second point, but there is a third still to be made. Her argument seems to ignore the entire utilitarian-esque spectrum of preferred outcomes. Stoicism is fully capable of condemning slavery both for the damage it does to the enslaver’s character, and because being treated as property is a dispreferred state-of-affairs. But, while these critiques of her position may be warranted, they do not address the question she raises: ‘how can a philosophy that denies the ability of one person to treat another unethically address social phenomena like slavery?’.

While the Stoic could not condemn such an external state of affairs as unethical, they also need not be sanguine about it. Rather, the Stoic would pass unsparing ethical judgement on themselves for how their own actions reflected or failed to reflect the virtue of justice. In this way, Stoicism does not counsel acquiescence to what cannot be accepted, but that we hold ourselves accountable for the ways we have perpetuated—in the words we said or failed to say, in the actions we took or failed to take—that which we cannot accept. It asks that we honestly consider, not what needs to change for us to be satisfied with the world, but what we must do to be satisfied with ourselves as co-creators of this world. The Stoic is not constrained by what can be done, but guided by what virtue requires. “Stoic intentions are not ‘good intentions’ but ‘intentions that are good’—in other words, firm, determined, and resolved to overcome all obstacles,” (Hadot, 1998, p. 194). 

It is precisely because of the Stoic’s deep commitment to their intentions that they must accept whatever results they produce. A commitment to results is vulnerable to despair; not so with a commitment to action. “Do what you must; let happen what may,” (Hadot, 1998, p.194). There is more Stoicism to Angela Davis’s quote than it might first appear. She did not, after all, argue for acting until things became acceptable, but for acting in a way guided by her refusal to accept those things that violated her sense of what was just. Among those things that a person cannot control is their own sense of what is just. They need only choose whether to ignore or act upon it.

5. The Verdict

This paper sought to answer two questions: (1) does the Stoic ethical system offer something necessary for ethical leadership, and (2) is it sufficient for guiding such leadership. The answer to the first question must be ‘yes’ since the Stoic concept of oikeiosis so closely mirrors what has been identified by several well-regarded theories as the core developmental pattern characterizing ethical leadership. As for whether Stoicism on its own is sufficient, the answer is a more tentative ‘yes’. Stoicism compares well with utilitarianism, which might be considered the default ethic of most Western cultures. And by keeping leaders accountable for their character, Stoicism effectively addresses some of the problems created by a purely utilitarian framework. It accomplishes this, in part, by focusing on principles and process applied to an ever-broadening circle of concern with the maturing of oikeiosis. 

The leader maintains a strong, ethically-rooted and principle-based center from which to expand the scope of their actions. In these ways, it represents a middle-road between being and doing according to which the former is the foundation of the latter and, thus, cannot be sacrificed to further it. Of course, a highly developed sense of justice, and a resolute unwillingness to compromise one’s virtue to the allure of expediency may be required for a leader to stand up against systemic problems. But, as we have seen, these are core components of Stoicism, and the requirement to abide by them is unequivocal.

Machiavelli (1513) was astute in observing that a leader is either loved or feared—hierarchies are either based on prestige, wherein a combination of the leader’s ability and character inspire followership, or dominance wherein the threat of imposed cost coerces it (Maner & Case, 2016). At its core, any theory of ethical leadership is attempting to provide guidance on establishing a position of prestige without allowing it to devolve into one of dominance. The Dichotomy of Control and relative importance assigned to character as compared with externals provide the strongest of philosophical safeguards against such slippage. Meanwhile, concepts such as oikeiosis and rationality, and the virtues of wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance provide potent but not overly rigid guidance on becoming a leader worthy of admiration. 

Through the course of this paper, I have argued that Stoicism encourages the kind of moral maturity that effective, ethical leaders must exhibit; that Stoicism acknowledges the need for pragmatic, cost-benefit focused decision making, but never at the expense of eroding ethical standards; that Stoicism is, in fact, well suited to address large scale challenges because it places the fight for justice inside each of us where, though it may be ignored, it cannot be abandoned. Given the apparent difficulty of formulating a modern theory of ethical leadership, perhaps it is time to seriously consider an ancient one.