A Stoic is someone who follows the philosophy of Stoicism. There is no authority which decides whether one is a Stoic or not, nor is there some ritual to perform that makes one a Stoic. Is being a Stoic, then, just a matter of calling oneself one? While there is no hierarchy to determine who is and who is not a Stoic, to be one, I believe, is more than just a matter of making the claim. How do I know? I know because of the words of the great Stoic teacher Epictetus. Examine his words, as recorded by his student Arrian, and you may be surprised to learn what makes one a Stoic.
In Epictetus’ Discourses (Book 2:19), ‘Against Those Who Embrace Philosophical Opinions is Words Only,’ he reveals the five hallmarks of a Stoic. The discourse begins with the examination of a paradox called the Ruling Argument. This seems to be a paradox where there are three propositions given, each apparently true. However, any two chosen will always be shown to be in contradiction to the third remaining one. When asked his opinion on the paradox, Epictetus’ response is that he does not know. Epictetus states that Diodorus had one opinion, Panthoides and Cleanthes another, and Chrysippus, a third opinion. Epictetus, seemingly repeats the question, “What then is your opinion?” His rhetorical response, “I was not made for this purpose, to examine appearances that occur to me and to compare what others say and to form an opinion of my own on the thing. Therefore I differ not at all from the grammarian.” We know that this is purely rhetorical because examining appearances, and making a right use of them, is a process mentioned many times in the Discourses.
Epictetus then continues with the example of a purported Stoic who, while skilled in argumentation and the use of syllogisms, nevertheless trembles with fear in the face of various situations. He ends the paragraph with a question to this real or imaginary character, “Why did you call yourself a Stoic?”
The paragraph which followed begins with Epictetus advising his students to
Observe yourselves thus in your actions, and you will find to what sect you belong. You will find that most of you are Epicureans, a few Peripatetics, and those feeble. (Discourses 2:19)
To know what school of philosophy you belong to, you must first examine your own actions. If you want to know whether you are a Stoic or not, observe yourselves thus in your actions to find out. Epictetus tells his audience, his students, that most of them will discover themselves to really be Epicureans, devoted to pleasure as the highest good. This may have chagrined some of his students. After all, they were attending a school of Stoicism to learn to be Stoics, and now they find out that they are Epicureans, masquerading as Stoics. Epictetus tells them that their actions reveal what they really are, and that they are not Stoics, those who hold virtue to be the only good, but in fact they are the opposite, Epicureans, regarding pleasure to be the highest good. Perhaps there were a few students present, who, upon self-examination, discovered that by their actions they do consider virtue to be a good, but not the sole good, nor even the highest.
These are the Peripatetics. Epictetus rebukes their efforts as feeble. Peripatetics considered virtue to be a good, true, but they considered it to be just one good among many. Were they feeble Peripatetics because they rarely choose virtue as their first good, and tended to opt for one of the other things which the Peripatetics also held as good, such as health or friendship? Epictetus continues:
For wherein will you show that you really consider virtue equal to everything else or even superior? (Discourses 2:19)
Here, I believe, Epictetus identifies the first hallmark of the Stoic: one whose actions demonstrate that he holds virtue, and especially moral excellence, to be the highest good. Stoicism is not measured by a recitation of what one has read, or an explication of what one knows or what one believes, but rather what one does. Epictetus demands that we observe our own actions.
But show me a Stoic, if you can. Where or how? But you can show me an endless number who utter small arguments of the Stoics. For do the same persons repeat the Epicurean opinions any worse? And the Peripatetic, do they not handle them also with equal accuracy? (Discourses 2:19)
Is Stoic doctrine (theory) not important? Doctrine is important insofar as it produces change in a person. But if theory is just treated as a bunch of facts to know, then its importance is nullified. Knowledge of Stoic theory does not make a Stoic, because knowing theory is different from putting it into practice. Seneca was well versed in Epicurean theory, and yet he was a practicing Stoic.
Who then is a Stoic? As we call a statue Phidiac which is fashioned according to the art of Phidias, so show me a man who is fashioned according to the doctrines which he utters. (Discourses 2:19)
This, then, is the second hallmark of the Stoic, one who has been fashioned, changed, altered, by applying Stoic doctrine. How can we see that one has been fashioned into a Stoic? What is the visible trait we can see to determine that one has indeed been fashioned according to the principles of Stoicism? Epictetus tells us:
Show me a man who is sick and happy, in danger and happy, dying and happy, in exile and happy, in disgrace and happy. Show him: I desire, by the gods, to see a Stoic. (Discourses 2:19)
Now we have a third hallmark of the Stoic, the man who is happy. Happiness, or eudaimonia, is our natural state. This Greek word, eudaimonia, has been translated in various ways. It is composed of eu-, signifying good in ancient Greek, and -daimon, in reference to spirit. Simply put it could mean “good spirit” or to be in good spirits. Over time it seems that the word came to indicate that which places one in a good spirit, such as a well-flowing life. George Long has translated this term using the word happy. Admittedly this English word is inadequate to express the fullness of what the Greek word eudaimonia implies. In another discourse Epictetus states God has made all men to be happy and to be free of perturbation (Discourses 3:14), which could also be translated as “God has made all men to be in good spirits and to be free of perturbation,” for when we live our lives according to our nature and the nature of the Cosmos, we will be happy or in good spirits. This is why the Stoic strives to live the virtuous life, because, as Musonius Rufus tells us in Lecture 7, there is no other end in becoming good than to become happy and to live happily for the remainder of our lives.
Happiness, a well-flowing life, is the goal, but also our natural state. All of us have deviated from this natural state, and thus are in various states of happiness and unhappiness. Stoic doctrine leads one back to one’s natural state of peace.
What then is the fruit of these opinions? It is that which ought to be the most noble and the most becoming to those who are really educated, release from perturbation, release from fear, freedom (Discourses 2:1).
Great is the combat, divine is the work. It is for kingship, for freedom, for happiness, for freedom from perturbation (Discourses 2:18).
Following Stoicism will lead one to tranquility, courage, and freedom, summed up with the word happiness. Yet this is not the happiness of a mad man or a child on Christmas Day, but of a serene spirit, of an unperturbed mind, which results from forming one’s life to this particular philosophy.
Elsewhere Epictetus states that it is in your own power to be happy (Discourses 3:8), and that the gods have allowed you to be above those things which they have not placed in your power (Discourses 1:12).
Must a Stoic possess a good spirit under all circumstances, or at least under the very ones Epictetus points out? The truth is that we all fall short of perfect peace. Why? Because we do not reason perfectly, we do not make perfect use of appearances, we do not judge perfectly, nor do we consistently apply the faculty of desire and aversion perfectly. Only the Sage is perfect, and only the Sage can reach the lofty goal of perfect peace because only the Sage judges perfectly, and applies all aspects of the philosophy perfectly to his or her life. Since we are not Sages, we will not be unmoved by the vicissitudes of life, though they may not touch us as they touch others.
A Stoic may be moved by the injury or death of a loved one or child, because, after all, the most difficult things to endure in life require the highest degree of development, and perhaps there are some things that only a Sage can endure in perfect peace. It should be noted that Epictetus does not mention this particular type of trial in the above quote from the chapter we are studying.
You cannot show me one fashioned so. But show me at least one who is forming, who has shown a tendency to be a Stoic. Do me this favor. Do not grudge an old man seeing a sight which I have not seen yet. Do you think that you must show me the Zeus of Phidias or the Athena, a work of ivory and gold? (Discourses 2:19)
Epictetus concedes to his students that they may not be able to show him one who can maintain a good spirit in the situations he has given. The man who is, and the man who will always choose virtue as the highest good, is the Sage. And while Sagehood is the ultimate goal for the Stoic, it may be a nearly impossible goal to achieve, as already alluded to. So Epictetus will settle for seeing, at the very least, one who is forming, who has shown a tendency to be a Stoic through practice.
In fact, for Epictetus – who never claimed to be a Sage – Stoic practice would be a continuous process of improvement, and one who is making progress along the Stoic path is referred to as a prokopton. How does a prokopton show a tendency to be a Stoic?
The prokopton shows a tendency to be a Stoic by showing a tendency to choose virtue as the highest good, if not the only good, and thereby increasing their personal virtue, which then has a corresponding effect on one’s peace of mind. Now if virtue promises good fortune and tranquility and happiness, certainly also the progress toward virtue is progress toward each of these things (Discourses 1:4). A Stoic need not be perfect, but a true prokopton should show progressive improvement in virtue, and thus improvement in tranquility.
Let any of you show me a human soul ready to think as God does, and not to blame either God or man; ready not to be disappointed about anything, not to consider himself damaged by anything, not to be angry, not to be envious, not to be jealous. And why should I not say it direct, desirous from a man to become a god, and in this poor mortal body thinking of his fellowship with Zeus. (Discourses 2:19)
Now we arrive at Epictetus’ fourth hallmark of who is a Stoic: the human soul ready to think as God does (Discourses 2:19). What does it mean to think as God does? As the Cosmos ordains or allows what happens to happen, for its own good, to think as God does is to want what God wants.
Whatever the Cosmos causes to happen, I also want it to happen, and whatever does not happen, for the Cosmos did not cause it to happen, I do not wish it to happen. This, simply put, is to think as God does, and for one who does think as God thinks, there is no reason to be disappointed regarding what happens, nor to consider oneself damaged by what happens, for that which the Cosmos brings, it brings to fulfill its purposes, for the benefit of the Whole, and the part as well. There is no need for one to be angry and no point in one being envious or jealous, since he knows that these things are assigned to him according to the Universal arrangement, and the Whole is superior to the part, as the state to the citizen (Discourses 2.10).
When one thinks as God does, one will no longer blame God or man for anything that happens. One will view that which comes as beneficial for the Cosmos, but also for one’s personal benefit, for that is good for every part of nature which the nature of the Whole brings (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 2.3). Where there is no room for one to wish things to be any different than as they are, there will be no room for anger, envy, or jealousy.
What else is happiness than obtaining exactly what we want and avoiding what we don’t want, for happiness and tranquility are not attainable by man otherwise than by not failing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which he would avoid (Discourses 1:4).
If one conforms one’s will to want what happens to happen, and to not wish to happen what does not happen, there will be no room for unhappiness. We will then become like God, not in the sense of omnipotence or omniscience, but in the sense imperturbability, tranquility, and peace – and in this way share in God’s fellowship.
Show me the man. But you cannot. Why then do you delude yourselves and cheat others? And why do you put on a guise which does not belong to you, and walk about being thieves and pilferers of these names and things which do not belong to you? (Discourses 2:19)
Epictetus knows that his audience cannot show him the man who demonstrates even a tendency to be a Stoic, who is at least forming into a Stoic; nor can they show him a man who is ready to think as God does, to be of one mind with God. And yet it seems that among this same audience there were some who were already referring to themselves as Stoics, undeservedly. This is an ancient case of stolen valor. Epictetus condemns these Stoic pretenders as imposters, cheats and frauds, for taking a name which does not belong to them, and for fooling others into believing them, by their talk and pretense, to be authentic. This accusation may have been a hard blow for some of his students to hear. How many today are undeservedly claiming the Stoic mantle while deviating far from Stoic practice?
And now I am your teacher, and you are instructed in my school. And I have this purpose, to make you free from restraint, compulsion, hindrance; to make you free, prosperous, happy, looking to God in everything small and great. And you are here to learn and practice these things. Why, then, do you not finish the work, if you also have such a purpose as you ought to have, and if I, in addition to the purpose, also have such qualification as I ought to have? What is that which is wanting? When I see an artificer and material by him, I expect the work. Here, then, is the artificer, here the material. What is it that we want? Is not the thing one that can be taught? It is. Is it not, then, in our power? The only thing of all that is in our power (Discourses 2:19)
Epictetus acknowledges his role as teacher, and what his purpose is as their teacher. More importantly, he acknowledges that his students can indeed become worthy of the name Stoic. His students did not come to his school to be mere readers of what other Stoics wrote, or to repeat the opinions of others; they came to the school to be changed, to have their characters and minds changed. Epictetus, after the harsh statement given to them previously, is now urging them forward to achieve the original goal they had when they entered the school, to acquire the character of a Stoic, the character of one who is released from perturbation, one who is in the state of eudaimonia. By urging them on, Epictetus is implying that they are capable of becoming free from restraint, compulsion, hindrance,… free, prosperous, happy, looking to God in everything small and great.
It is to this end that we prokoptons should also seek to arrive. He who is a Stoic should have this as their continual goal. If we trust the words of Epictetus, then we can trust that the means to achieve this goal can be taught. And not only can it be taught, but Epictetus tells us further that it is the only thing that is truly and completely within their power.
Neither wealth is in our power, nor health, nor reputation, nor, in a word, anything else except the right use of appearances. This right use is by nature free from restraint; this alone is free from impediment. (Discourses 2:19).
The right use of appearances is the principal means by which we acquire the character of the Stoic. The right use of appearances is the fifth hallmark of what it means to be a Stoic. The Stoic motto is to live according to nature. For a rational being, to act in accordance with nature is also to act in accordance with reason (Meditations 7:1). Now reason, for what purpose has it been given by nature? For the right use of appearances (Discourses 1.20).
Reason itself has been given to us that we may make a right use of appearances. The appearance, when this is correctly used it means serenity, cheerfulness, constancy; it also means justice and law and self-control and virtue as a whole (Musonius Rufus, Fragment 38). Epictetus echoes this statement when he tells his students that if one takes care of this faculty of using appearances, and consider it your only possession, you will never be hindered, never meet with impediments; you will not lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter any person (Discourses 1:1).
One who professes to be a Stoic should be exerting continuous effort to make right use of appearances. The exact nature of what this is and what it entails may be the subject of a future essay.
Why then do you not finish the work? Tell me the reason. For it is either through my fault that you do not finish it, or through your own fault, or through the nature of the thing. The thing itself is possible, and the only thing in our power. It remains then that the fault is either in me, or in you, or, what is nearer the truth, in both. Well then, are you willing that we begin at last to bring such a purpose into this school, and to take no notice of the past? Let us only make a beginning. Trust to me, and you will see. (Discourses 2:19).
Epictetus accepts that the fault of his students not advancing far enough along the Stoic path is not entirely theirs; he accepts his part of the blame.
He urges them now to forget the past flawed purpose of being mere readers and to make a new beginning with the new purpose of attending the school in order to become free from restraint, compulsion, hindrance…, to become free, prosperous, happy, looking to God in everything small and great.
He asks them to trust him, that they may see a difference in their lives.
Who is a Stoic? Epictetus has told us, and almost two thousand years after his death we, who are prokoptons, continue to place our trust in Epictetus’ wisdom as we strive to acquire that exalted name of Stoic by first acquiring the exalted character of the Stoic.
Anyone can acquire this character and truthfully be a Stoic by fashioning himself according to the doctrines of Stoic philosophy and choosing virtue as his only good, by conforming his will to God’s will and making a right use of whatever appearance presents itself, and, by doing these things, becoming happier, better, more at peace. That is who a Stoic is.
